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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EXTRADITING THE FOREIGN FUGITIVE:
DISENTITLEMENT IN CIVIL FORFEITURE. UNITED STATES V. ALL ASSETS
LISTED IN ATTACHMENT A, 89 F. SUPP. 3D 817 (E.D. VA. 2015)
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are residing in your home country, and suddenly you
receive a notice for your arrest. You are shocked as you learn that the dealings from your successful self-made business have violated laws in another
country where you have never lived nor visited. Suddenly, extradition proceedings begin in order to bring you to this foreign country to face criminal
charges. Like most reasonable people, you resist the extradition because you
want to stay in your own country with your own home and family. In an
effort to fight with all your might, you hire a lawyer to help you contest the
extradition.
As your extradition is pending, you receive another notice. On top of
everything else, the foreign country is now trying to extradite you to face
criminal charges and seeking a forfeiture action to seize your bank accounts
and other property. The millions of dollars you have earned through hard
work in your company, and perhaps even your home, is now on the line.
You try to contest the forfeiture action, but you are informed by the foreign
country that you are a fugitive from the law, and thus not entitled to the protection of the courts. As a result, the foreign government claims that your
accounts are illegal proceeds of your alleged criminal actions and seizes all
of your accounts.
Surely, this does not seem like a possible problem in the United States
with all of the protections of the Constitution, but one may be surprised.
These are the same events that faced Kim Dotcom (“Dotcom”), a resident of
New Zealand, and the other website operators of Megaupload.com.1 In
2012, the United States charged Dotcom and the four operators of
Megaupload.com with conspiracy to commit copyright infringement and
issued warrants for their arrests.2 The five defendants resisted extradition to
the United States according to their rights under existing extradition treaties.3

1. Trevor Burrus, And You Thought Civil Asset Forfeiture Was Bad Enough, CATO
INST. (July 9, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/you-thought-civil-asset
forfeiture-was-bad-enough.
2. United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818 (E.D.
Va. 2015).
3. Burrus, supra note 1.
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In response to the resistance, the U.S. government filed a civil forfeiture action in regards to several of Dotcom’s and the other defendants’ assets, claiming that the assets were proceeds of the conspiracy.4 A civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding that the government initiates in order to seek
forfeiture of property tainted by some form of illegality.5 When the claimants attempted to contest the forfeiture of their property, the U.S. District
Court of the Eastern District of Virginia declared them to be fugitives under
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, and thus not entitled to use the resources of the court to litigate the civil forfeiture action.6
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2466, states
that a judicial officer may use discretion in preventing a person from using
the “resources of the court” to further a claim in any related civil forfeiture
action upon finding that the person is a fugitive who is evading criminal
prosecution.7 Because Dotcom and the others had received notice of warrants for their arrest in the criminal matter and were resisting extradition to
the United States, the district court concluded that Dotcom and the website
operators were fugitives.8 The court stated that these events provided evidence that the defendants were evading criminal prosecution and were thus
disentitled from defending the civil forfeiture action in court.9 After applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the court ruled that their due process

4. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 817.
5. 1–18 ROBERT S. FINK, ET.AL.,TAX CONTROVERSIES—AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS,
TRIALS §18.01, LexisNexis (2015); see also N. Brock Collins, Note, Fugitives and Forfeiture
– Flouting the System or Fundamental Right?, 83 KY. L.J. 631, 632 (1995) (explaining that in
rem means that the confiscated property is the defendant in the civil forfeiture action, and not
the property’s owner).
6. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 835.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012):
(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the
courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture
action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such person –
(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has
been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid a criminal prosecution—
(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United
States;
(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to
submit to its jurisdiction; or
(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in
which a criminal case is pending against the person; and
(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for
commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction.
8. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 827.
9. Id. at 826–32.
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right to defend their property was waived in the civil forfeiture action due to
their fugitive status, leaving them with no other defense of their property.10
This note proposes that the fugitive entitlement doctrine should have no
application in civil forfeiture actions concerning criminal suspects living
abroad who are legally resisting extradition for two reasons: first, these suspects cannot be properly labeled as “fugitives” due to their exercise of a
legal right; second, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was originally tailored towards criminal appeals. Thus, its modernized application in civil
forfeiture actions regarding claimants abroad is overbroad, deprives claimants of their rights, and presents opportunities for government abuse. At a
minimum, claimants involved in extradition should not be included in the
doctrine’s definition of “fugitive” or automatically labeled as fugitives under
the intent element of the doctrine. Instead, this note suggests that extradition
claimants should be excluded from the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine altogether.
Part II examines the history behind the concept and purpose of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and its broadening application to civil forfeiture
actions, the enlarging scope of the label “fugitive,” as well as the circuit
court split regarding the intent element of the doctrine. Part III identifies the
problems with this expansive application of the doctrine, as well as the due
process, extradition, and governmental abuse concerns that the use of the
doctrine creates. Part IV considers a new definition of “fugitive,” which
excludes extradition claimants in order to preserve their rights, and proposes
that the intent analysis of the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits under
the doctrine be adopted as the universal test. Part V finally proposes that
extradition claimants should be excluded from the application of the doctrine all together.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Fugitive Disentitlement Under the Common Law

The history of United States’ fugitive disentitlement doctrine spans
over one hundred years.11 Initially, the doctrine was used to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who was a “fugitive from justice” while his appeal was
pending.12 If the convicted criminal defendant fled from justice while his
appeal was pending, the courts could invoke the doctrine to disentitle him

10. Id. at 832 n.21.
11. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (applying the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who was a fugitive from justice for the first
time).
12. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993).
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from pursuing that appeal.13 The Supreme Court created the doctrine due to
concerns that judicial proceedings would have no effect on the fugitive, and
any adverse judgment would thus be unenforceable against the fugitive due
to his flight.14 Without power over the fugitive, the Court determined that it
had discretion to refuse to hear the criminal’s appeal unless he was in court,
where he could be made to respond to any judgment rendered.15 Thus, the
doctrine prevented a fugitive evading justice from seeking relief in an appeal
from the same authority he evaded.16
1.

Who Is a Fugitive Under Common Law?

Under the common law disentitlement doctrine, fugitive status applied
to a narrower class of people than its modern, codified counterpart. At
common law, a “fugitive” was defined as a person who, after committing a
crime, fled the jurisdiction of the court where the crime was committed or
left his place of residence and hid himself.17 Later, the term was extended to
suspected criminals who had not been convicted or arrested, but who left the
jurisdiction for the purpose of escaping arrest or prosecution for the alleged
crime.18 As long as the person left the jurisdiction voluntarily, he was considered a fugitive even if he had no control over his failure to return.19
The term “fugitive” thus only applied to defendants and suspected
criminals who had first been in the jurisdiction of the courts and later fled in
order to avoid criminal proceedings.20 Fugitive status was not assigned to
citizens of foreign countries who had never even entered the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.21 As Justice Holmes stated over a century ago,
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the
harm as if [the foreign actor] had been present at the effect, if the State

13. Martha B. Stolley, Supreme Court Review: Sword or Shield: Due Process and the
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997).
14. Id. at 753.
15. Id. at 753–54.
16. Id. at 752.
17. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2004).
18. Collins, supra note 5, at 637.
19. Id.
20. See Collazos, 368 F.3d at 199 (describing common law fugitives as persons who
allegedly committed crimes while in the U.S. and then fled the country after learning that
their arrest was sought).
21. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 63 (2015). (explaining how modern
disentitlement doctrine extends beyond common law fugitives to encompass persons who
have never previously been in the United States).
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should succeed in getting [the person] within its power, . . . [but] it does not
follow that [the person] is a fugitive from justice.”22
2.

Rationales Behind the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

At common law, several rationales were set forth to justify the application and suitability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.23 In Smith v. United States,24 the Supreme Court reasoned that the use of the doctrine to dismiss an appeal when a convicted party fled its jurisdiction was necessary
because the court could not enforce its judgment against the party unless he
was present in court to receive the judgment of the appeal.25 The doctrine
was also used to ensure orderly and efficient proceedings to avoid the delay
caused by a fugitive’s escape.26
Courts rationalized the use of fugitive disentitlement in other ways, as
well.27 For example, the doctrine was seen as necessary to protect the dignity
of the court by preventing a criminal appellant from disappearing and thus
flouting the authority of the trial court and the court adjudicating his appeal.28 Deterrence was another rationale issued for the use of the doctrine.29
Courts reasoned that a criminal defendant would be deterred from escaping
justice if his privilege to challenge his conviction would be lost when he was
recaptured.30 The fourth rationale issued by the courts for application of the
doctrine was disentitlement.31 Courts interpreted a fugitive’s flight from
justice as a waiver or abandonment of any appeal or claim.32
3.

Disentitlement and Due Process

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that an individual
be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend the claims against him.33
22. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
23. Kiran H. Griffith, Comment, Fugitives in Immigration: A Call for Legislative
Guidelines on Disentitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 209, 209 (2012).
24. 94 U.S. 97 (1879).
25. Angelo M. Russo, Note, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong
Turn in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirement
of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest Inparretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L. REV.
1041, 1050 (2000).
26. Stolley, supra note 13, at 778.
27. Id. at 776–82 (discussing the four main rationales behind the disentitlement doctrine).
28. Id. at 779.
29. Id. at 780.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 777.
32. Stolley, supra note 13, at 777.
33. Brief Amici Curiae for the Cato Inst., Inst. for Justice, and Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal
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Due process thus prevents courts from constitutionally dismissing an action
without providing a party an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his
case.34 Constitutional due process encompasses the right to be heard and to
defend,35 but it does not include a constitutional right to appeal a prior
judgment.36 Thus, disentitlement originally treated a defendant’s flight during the pendency of an appeal as a waiver or abandonment of his desire to
appeal.37
4.

Broadening Application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The application of the disentitlement doctrine began in criminal appeals,38 but its use has evolved to encompass other situations as well.39 Fugitives no longer had to flee a specific sovereign to invoke the doctrine’s use;
flight from any sovereign barred the fugitive from the right to appeal.40 The
doctrine was also extended to prevent a “fugitive in a separate but related
criminal case from seeking affirmative relief from the court in a civil proceeding.”41 More recently, circuit courts invoked the disentitlement doctrine
in civil, in rem proceedings.42
Until recently, the circuit courts, however, were split regarding the use
of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil forfeiture actions.43 The majority of circuit courts held that a fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture action
was “flouting the judicial system and [thus] was not entitled to due process.”44 The Seventh Circuit was the first to hold otherwise, stating that preclusion from procedural self-defense represented a violation of due process.45 The court stated that regardless of an individual’s status, “where he is
vulnerable to being sued,” the Supreme Court has established that such a
claimant “has the right to defend himself [in an] action brought against
him.”46 The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this split in Degen v. UnitDef. Lawyers in Support of Claimants-Appellants at 5, United States v. All Assets Listed in
Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 15-1360) [hereinafter Brief Amici
Curiae].
34. Stolley, supra note 13, at 772.
35. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33.
36. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
37. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 240 (1993).
38. Griffith, supra note 23, at 213–14.
39. Collins, supra note 5.
40. Id.
41. Stolley, supra note 13, at 756.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 760.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. United States v. $40,877.59 in U.S. Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1994).
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ed States,47 but its efforts failed to remedy the confusion and inequity regarding the application of disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions.48 Congress, however, effectively ended this split by codifying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine’s application in civil forfeiture actions.49
B.

The Modern Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

Civil forfeiture underwent a massive reform embodied in the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).50 As a part of this reform,
Congress codified the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in CAFRA under 28
U.S.C. § 2466.51 The codification of the doctrine effectively settled the questions left from the Supreme Court’s decision in Degen by specifically endowing statutory authority over federal courts to order disentitlement in civil
forfeiture actions.52
1.

Statutory Elements of 28 U.S.C. § 2466

The statutory disentitlement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2466 extends the
doctrine beyond its use in common law.53 The statute states five prerequisites courts must find before ordering disentitlement:
(1) a warrant or similar process must have been issued in a criminal case
for the claimant’s apprehension; (2) the claimant must have had notice or
knowledge of the warrant or process; (3) the criminal case must be related to the forfeiture action; (4) the claimant must not be confined or otherwise held in custody in another jurisdiction; and (5) the claimant must
have deliberately avoided prosecution by leaving the United States, declining to enter or reenter the country, or otherwise evading the criminal
court’s jurisdiction.54

The statute thus expanded the status of “fugitive” to encompass persons
who refused to return to the United States or refused to enter the country for
47. 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
48. Stolley, supra note 13, at 783; see also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 829
(1996) (stating that the Court need not decide if enforcement of disentitlement would violate
due process).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012).
50. David B. Smith, Feature, An Insider’s View of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2000, 24 CHAMPION 28, 28 (2000).
51. Id. at 32.
52. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 2004).
53. Id. at 197 (stating that statutory disentitlement extended to individuals
who have never previously been in the U.S. but have notice that they are subject to arrest in
this country, and, therefore, refuse to enter to enter its jurisdiction to avoid prosecution).
54. United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1055–56 (9th
Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012).
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the first time, even if they were legally residing outside the jurisdiction.55
The broader scope of the statute effectively prevents a claimant from defending a civil action from abroad.56
The codified statute, however, does not make disentitlement mandatory; federal courts have been given discretion to decide whether to bar fugitives from pursuing claims in related civil forfeiture actions.57 The discretionary element of disentitlement allowing a claimant to contest fugitive
status was included to prevent the government from abusing disentitlement
by attempting to seize property in forfeiture that was not subject to forfeiture.58 Additionally, the discretionary element was meant to protect persons
living abroad from indictment for the sole purpose of invoking the doctrine
and forfeiting their property when they fail to appear in the United States to
contest charges.59
2.

The New Scope of Fugitive Disentitlement

The fugitive disentitlement doctrine now applies to broader classes of
people than the original doctrine under common law.60 The statute defines
“fugitive,” and requires courts to first find that a claimant fits within that
definition before invoking the use of disentitlement.61 Under common law,
fugitive disentitlement applied to alleged criminals who had fled the jurisdiction of the United States to escape prosecution.62 Individuals who had
never previously entered the United States were not considered “fugitives”
by the court.63

55. Id. at 1056.
56. Joel T. Kornfield & Anthony A. De Corso, Uncivil Forfeitures: Skillful Practitioners
Can Take Advantage of the Newly Available Remedies to Undo Unjustified Civil Forfeitures,
L.A. LAWYER, Oct. 2003, at 39, 46.
57
Smith, supra note 50, at 32.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (extending fugitive status to claimants
who have never been in the United States, but decline to enter for the purpose of avoiding
prosecution).
61. Id.
62. United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 824 (E.D.
Va. 2015) (according to traditional common law, fugitives were persons who allegedly committed crimes while in the United States and who, upon learning of their arrest, fled the country purposely to avoid criminal prosecution).
63. Id.
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Broader definition of fugitive

The scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2466, however, encompasses the common
law classifications and beyond.64 Subpart A of the statute applies to traditional common law fugitives who fled the country upon learning of their
arrests for crimes purportedly committed in the United States.65 The use of
the phrase “reenter” in subpart B applies to the other common law class of
fugitives, namely those who were outside the country when they received
notice of their arrests for alleged crimes committed while in the United
States and who refused to return to the jurisdiction to face prosecution.66
Subpart B also extends the doctrine’s use beyond the common law usage by
its inclusion of the phrase “decline to enter . . . the United States.”67 This
provision enables the application of disentitlement to individuals who had
never entered the United States, but who refused to enter the country to
avoid criminal prosecution.68
The statute broadened the scope of the doctrine to apply to a claimant
who “otherwise evade[d] the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal
case is pending against [him].”69 As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit noted,
“[E]vasion” is an expansive concept . . . [and] is broad enough to include
the deliberate flight identified in subpart (A) and the refusal to “enter or
reenter” identified in subpart (B) . . . [thus] indicat[ing] that the evasion
referred to in subpart (C) reaches beyond these specific examples to myriad means that human ingenuity might devise to permit a person to avoid
the jurisdiction of a court where a criminal case is pending against him. 70

As a result, subpart C of the statutory definition has been enlarged to
encompass almost any action taken to avoid the jurisdiction of a court not
already covered in the previous subparts. 71

64. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
65. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2466(a)(1)(A).
66. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2466(a)(1)(B).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(B) (2012).
68. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C).
70. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 200.
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C).
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Statutory intent element

Despite its application to a broader class of claimants, the text of the
codified disentitlement doctrine requires that a claimant must have declined
to enter, re-enter, or otherwise evade a court’s jurisdiction with the intent to
avoid criminal prosecution.72 The statute does not specify the “requisite
showing of intent” necessary to show that the alleged fugitive acted in order
to avoid criminal prosecution.73 As a result, the circuit courts split on the
requisite intent necessary to satisfy the statute.74
Three views have emerged regarding the necessary showing of intent in
order to invoke the use of disentitlement.75 The first view, held by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, holds that “mere
notice or knowledge of an outstanding warrant, coupled with a refusal to
enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute.”76 The alleged fugitive
must have declined to enter or reenter the United States with the express
purpose of avoiding criminal prosecution.77
The second view, held by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, holds that the intent of the alleged fugitive should be analyzed under the totality of the circumstances.78 Under this view, all circumstances of the claimant are analyzed to indicate whether the claimant made a
conscious choice not to enter or return to the United States to face criminal
charges against him.79 While claimants must be shown to have possessed a
72. Id. § 2466(a)(1).
73. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826.
74. See United States v. $6,976,934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scot.
Int’l, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 544 F.3d 123, 132
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that notice of an outstanding warrant and refusal to enter the United
States did not meet the intent element of the statute); see also Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (stating that the intent of the suspected fugitive must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances); see also United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1056
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a desire to avoid prosecution need not be the sole reason for the
alleged fugitive’s refusal to enter the United States).
75. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826.
76. $6,976,934.56, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d at 132 (finding insufficient evidence of intent
where claimant was living abroad before being charged with criminal conduct, and no other
evidence was provided to show he remained abroad to avoid prosecution); see also United
States v. Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 664 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding insufficient evidence of intent
where claimant’s ill health may have factored in his choice to remain abroad, rather than
avoidance of criminal prosecution).
77. $6, 976,934.56, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d at 132.
78. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826; see also Collazos, 368 F.3d
at 201.
79. See Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (finding sufficient evidence of intent to avoid
prosecution when claimant remained outside the U.S. upon notice of a warrant for her arrest,
failed to appear for deposition hearings, and unsuccessfully had attorney negotiate a surrender that would not involve her pretrial detention).
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specific intent to avoid criminal prosecution, that intent does not need to be
the only or motivating reason the claimants refused to enter the United
States.80
The third view regarding intent, held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, states that a “desire to avoid prosecution need
not be the sole reason for the claimant’s refusal to enter the United States.”81
Under this view, a claimant must have the specific intent to avoid prosecution, but that specific intent need not be the “sole, principal, or dominant
intent.”82 Specific intent is thus met if any of the claimant’s motivations for
declining to enter or reenter the United States was to avoid criminal prosecution.83
III. PROBLEMS: CONSEQUENCES AND OUTCOMES OF THE APPLICATION OF
28 U.S.C. § 2466
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine codified in CAFRA has defined
the term fugitive too broadly, and has created many complications. The new
definition of fugitive allows disentitlement in civil forfeiture on a much
larger scale than the original common law doctrine.84 As a result, this expansive application has created issues concerning due process and extradition
rights.85 The codification of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has also
presented many more opportunities for government abuse by its enlargement
of the fugitive class.86
A.

“Fugitives” Are Not Always Fugitives

The codification of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine at 28 U.S.C. §
2466 has broadened the potential class of defendants that can be labeled as
“fugitives.”87 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a fugitive as a “criminal sus80. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826.
81. Id.; see also United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1056
(9th Cir. 2013).
82. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826.
83. Technodyne, 753 F.3d at 386.
84. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
85. Smith, supra note 50, at 32; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Batato, 833
F.3d 413, No. 15–1360 (4th Cir. July 8, 2015) (stating that claimants who were exercising
their legal right to contest extradition were declared “fugitives” because they were not coming to the United States to defend their property).
86. See generally Darpana Sheth, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Forfeiture, 14
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 24, 24 (2013) (describing the potential for
governmental abuse in civil forfeiture); see also Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190 (2d
Cir. App. 2004) (describing the enlargement of the fugitive class due to the codification of
disentitlement).
87. See Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
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pect or a witness in a criminal case who flees, evades, or escapes arrest,
prosecution, imprisonment, service of process, or the giving of testimony,” 88
especially by “fleeing the jurisdiction or by hiding.”89 The statutory provision of disentitlement has changed the application of the doctrine by going
beyond this common law definition of fugitive and including persons who
have never previously been in the United States and who refuse to enter its
jurisdiction.90
These claimants, however, are not fugitives according to historical
common law precedents.91 Extradition claimants, such as Dotcom, who have
never been to the United States, are being labeled as fugitives and thus denied their due process rights in civil forfeiture simply because they chose to
fight extradition to stay at home in their country.92 There is also a question
as to their intent regarding their resistance of extradition. Statutory disentitlement requires that the criminal suspect acted “in order to avoid criminal
prosecution.”93 While some “fugitive” foreign claimants may resist extradition with the intent to avoid prosecution, other “fugitive” claimants may
have other motives behind their resistance to extradition.94
1.

Legal Rights and Extradition

An individual who is resisting extradition is not necessarily acting as a
fugitive attempting to flee or escape criminal prosecution; he may just be
exercising his legal right. For example, under the extradition treaty between
New Zealand and the United States, Dotcom has a legal right to contest his

88. Fugitive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
89. Id.
90. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 197.
91. See generally Collazos, 368 F.3d at 196–97 (describing common law a fugitive as a
person who avoided justice by fleeing the place where he allegedly committed the crime, and
not as a person who had committed acts outside of the jurisdiction).
92. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 827–31 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding Dotcom and other defendants were declared fugitives
within the doctrine’s application due to their failure to willingly submit themselves to the
United States’ jurisdiction through extradition).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1) (2012).
94. See generally United States v. Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 664 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that
the showing of intent lacked sufficiency when evidence showed claimant may have stayed
abroad for health reasons and not necessarily to avoid criminal prosecution); United States v.
$6,976, 934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scot. Int’l, Account No. 202956141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 554 F.3d 123, 132–33 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that the showing of intent was not sufficiently proved when evidence showed that claimant desired to stay abroad regardless of criminal proceedings against him in the United
States).
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extradition.95 According to New Zealand extradition law, the prosecution
must show that there is enough evidence to substantiate the criminal charges
against Dotcom, and Dotcom has a legal right to rebut these charges by
showing a lack of probable cause.96 Under many other extradition treaties,
an individual may be entitled to a hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that he committed the offense before he can legally be extradited to a foreign jurisdiction to face criminal prosecution.97 At
this hearing, the individual then has the right to offer evidence to contradict
or undermine the probable cause.98 Unfortunately, the courts often interpret
the exercise of this right as the claimant’s refusal to enter the jurisdiction to
face criminal prosecution, thus invoking the application of disentitlement.99
2.

Effect of the Intent Element on Extradition

The statutory disentitlement provision is silent on the required showing
of intent by an alleged fugitive.100 Instead, the codified doctrine only requires that an alleged fugitive must have acted “in order to avoid criminal
prosecution.”101 Under the totality of the circumstances view and the sole
reason to avoid prosecution view, the necessary intent of avoiding prosecution is too easily met in the cases involving extradition claimants simply by
the fact that these claimants resisted extradition. For example, a claimant has
been found to be an alleged fugitive with the intent to avoid prosecution
under the totality of the circumstances approach because the circumstance
indicated that the claimant made a conscious choice not to enter the United
States to face criminal prosecution.102 Under the sole reason view, the government can show a claimant’s specific intent to avoid criminal prosecution
if his motivation for declining to enter the United States was avoidance of
prosecution.103 Unfortunately, under the totality of the circumstances view
95. See generally Extradition, art. IV, N.Z.-U.S., Jan. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1 (requiring
sufficient evidence according to the laws of the place in which the person is located in order
to grant extradition).
96. Gyles Beckford & Rebecca Hamilton, Megaupload Founder Faces Lengthy Extradition Battle, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-piracy-megauploadextraditio-idUSTRE80O0B920120125 (last visited October. 27, 2016).
97. Michael John Garcia & Charles Doyle, Extradition to and from the United States:
Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 21–22
(2010), https:// www. fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 827–29
(E.D. Va. 2015) (showing that claimants have declined to enter the United States by contesting extradition).
100. Id. at 826.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1) (2012).
102. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).
103. United States v. Technodyne, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 368, 386 (2d Cir. 2014).
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and sole reason view, claimants who exercise their right to resist extradition
have been deemed fugitives with the necessary intent because their resistance to extradition has been interpreted as intent to avoid entering the
United States to face criminal prosecution.104
B.

Choices Between Rights

The statutory provision of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine results in
two sets of rights that cannot coexist with one another in the context of civil
forfeiture and extradition. Under various extradition treaties, a claimant has
one set of rights to legally contest extradition and the existence of probable
cause,105 and under the Constitution, a claimant has another set of rights that
requires an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of his property.106 Due to the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in a civil
forfeiture action, an extradition claimant is often forced to choose which of
these rights to exercise.107
1.

Due Process Rights “Voluntarily Waived”

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that an individual receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government
can deprive him of his property in civil forfeiture.108 This right has long been
recognized as fundamental, regardless of an individual’s status.109 Whether a
civil or criminal case, a person “must be permitted to defend himself in any
court where his antagonist can appear and prosecute.”110 This right belongs
to every individual, regardless of whether he violated the law.111 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine, however, extinguishes this due process right
when civil forfeiture claimants are haled into court, labeled as fugitives, and

104. See generally All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 827–32 (finding
five defendants to be fugitives subject to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in a civil forfeiture act because their resistance to extradition showed an intent to avoid entering the jurisdiction to face criminal prosecution); See also Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201; Technodyne, 753 F.3d
at 385.
105. Garcia & Doyle, supra note 97, at 21–22.
106. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
107. See generally All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F.Supp.3d at 827–32 (finding
that claimant intended to avoid prosecution through his contestation of extradition, which
disentitled him from defending his property in the civil forfeiture action).
108. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 48.
109. Stolley, supra note 13, at 770.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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disentitled from the opportunity to defend against the government’s seizure
of his property.112
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has answered this accusation in the civil forfeiture setting by stating that due process rights are not
wrongfully denied through the application of fugitive disentitlement because
the due process right in these cases has been waived.113 By refusing to appear in court for a related criminal case, a claimant is deemed to have knowingly waived his due process rights in the civil forfeiture action.114 A claimant’s flight from justice is treated by the court as tantamount to a waiver or
abandonment of his due process rights, thus resulting in no due process deprivation in a disentitlement proceeding.115 As a result, when an extradition
claimant exercises his right to contest extradition, he is labeled as a fugitive
with the intent to avoid criminal prosecution and thus “voluntarily” waives
his due process right to defend his property in a civil forfeiture action.116
2.

Extradition Rights v. Due Process Rights

Due to the above interpretation of due process rights in civil forfeiture
actions, an extradition claimant is entitled to exercise either his right to contest extradition117 or his due process right to defend his property,118 but not
both. A foreign claimant contesting extradition can only vindicate his due
process rights in regards to his property by submitting to the jurisdiction of
the courts where he is criminally charged, which then results in an opportunity for him to defend his property.119 The claimant must first surrender to
extradition, giving up his right to contest that extradition.120 Thus, a claimant
involved in extradition has the choice of only exercising one set of these
rights because the choice of one eliminates the other.

112. Id. at 771.
113. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
114. Id at 205–06.
115. Forfeitures and Penalties, supra note 21, § 53.
116. See United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 827–33
(E.D. Va. 2015) (finding that claimants consciously avoided criminal prosecution by resisting
extradition and disentitlement in the forfeiture action did not result in a due process violation).
117. See Garcia & Doyle, supra note 97, at 21–22 (explaining the hearing requirements
for extradition).
118. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 204–05.
119. Forfeitures and Penalties, supra note 21, § 53.
120. Id.
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Government Abuse in Civil Forfeiture

Disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions also creates an environment
that is ripe for abuse.121 The laws of civil forfeiture allow the government to
take property “[b]ased on a legal fiction that property can be guilty of a
criminal activity . . . regardless of whether the property owner is guilty or
innocent.”122 The enactment of CAFRA broadened the scope for potential
misuse of civil forfeiture by expanding the number of cases in which the
government can seize property allegedly connected to criminal conduct.123
The danger of abuse is also magnified when the government, despite an obvious conflict of interest, serves as both the beneficiary and accuser in a
civil forfeiture action.124 The potential for exploitation is even more serious
when courts apply the disentitlement doctrine to a foreign claimant because
it effectively transfers the claimant’s property to the government while
denying the claimant his due process right to be heard.125
1.

Increased Reach of the Government in Civil Forfeiture

The enactment of CAFRA, which added to existing civil forfeiture law,
has increased the reach of civil forfeiture, both in regards to the crimes and
the related property that are subject to seizure by the government.126 There
are now over 400 federal statutes that authorize forfeiture relating to federal
crimes, from environmental crimes to failure to report currency transactions.127 Recent civil forfeitures laws have also broadened the scope of the
property that can be seized from illegal drugs and the vehicles that transported them, to real and personal property connected to the alleged crime.128
CAFRA also subjects different classes of property to forfeiture, such as
property from proceeds of past crimes, property intended to commit or finance future crimes, and property that is involved in a current crime.129 Developed as a response to the overreaching and abuse of civil forfeiture statutes, CAFRA has instead exponentially increased the number of cases in
which the government can seize property through civil forfeiture.130
The jurisdiction of the United States courts concerning civil forfeiture
has also expanded to include crimes that can be committed extraterritorially,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Sheth, supra note 86, at 24.
Id.
Kornfield & De Corso, supra note 56, at 42.
Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 12.
Stolley, supra note 13, at 772.
Kornfield & De Corso, supra note 56, at 42.
Sheth, supra note 86, at 25.
Id.
Kornfield & De Corso, supra note 56, at 42.
Id.
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such as money laundering, drug trafficking, wire fraud, and international
terrorism.131 Concerning crimes such as these, the jurisdictional scope of the
relevant criminal statutes was interpreted as applying in civil forfeiture, because “Congress is presumed to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes where the nature of the crime does not depend on the locality of
the defendants’ acts and where restricting the statute to United States territory would severally diminish the statute’s effectiveness.”132 As a result, anyone who has ever made a payment online could be subject to United States
jurisdiction if his payment was processed through American servers.133
Due to the increased reach of the government’s jurisdiction, the modern scope of civil forfeiture increases the potential for governmental abuse,
and fugitive disentitlement heightens that potential.134 The government now
can bar a claimant from defending his property in many more situations than
before by merely asserting that the claimant is a fugitive avoiding prosecution and that his property is somehow associated with the suspected crime
from which he has escaped.135 The potential for abuse remains heightened in
the context of a claimant contesting extradition.136 With more types of crime
and increased categories of property subject to forfeiture,137 a claimant who
is contesting extradition will be deemed as avoiding entering the United
States in order to avoid prosecution and thus subject to disentitlement and
forfeiture of much more of his property.138
2.

Government as Beneficiary and Accuser

With the government serving simultaneously as the beneficiary and the
accuser, the potential for abuse in civil forfeiture is even more dangerous.139
Proceeds from forfeiture actions are placed into the Asset Forfeiture Fund,
which is managed by the United States Marshal’s Service, to be shared with
state and local agencies to assist in fighting crime.140 The revenue produced
by civil forfeiture has exploded as a direct result of federal law broadening
131. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).
132. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
133. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 13–14.
134. See Sheth, supra note 86, at 24.
135. Stolley, supra note 13, at 772.
136. See generally Kornfeld & De Corso, supra note 56, at 46 (stating that CAFRA
makes it impossible for a claimant to defend a civil forfeiture action from abroad because
claimants abroad always fall under the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine).
137. See Sheth, supra note 86, at 25.
138. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 827–32 (E.D. Va. 2015).
139. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 14–15.
140. William Lee Borden, Jr., Real Estate Forfeiture Under Federal Law, 48 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 164, 164 (1994).
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the scope in which civil forfeiture applies.141 The United States Department
of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund has “grown exponentially.”142 For example, it increased from $93.7 million in 1986 to over $1 billion by 2008.143
State law enforcement agencies have also benefited from these forfeitures
by receiving money from federal equitable-sharing programs, which pay
them up to eighty percent of the proceeds for referring civil forfeitures to
federal authorities. 144 These equitable-sharing programs provide a large part
of state and local law enforcement funds. Additionally, law enforcement can
use these funds in any way they see fit to support law enforcement activities.145
As a result of these programs, government and state actors benefit from
the proceeds and property seized through civil forfeiture.146 Lawyers at the
federal level have even been encouraged by the Department of Justice to
litigate more civil forfeitures actions in order to meet the Department’s targeted budget.147 Through its role as both beneficiary and accuser,148 law enforcement agents have been able to self-finance through forfeiture proceeds.149 These forfeiture proceeds, however, have been abused by law enforcement in several circumstances on questionable purchases, such as alcohol, drugs, prostitutes, football tickets, new cars, and television commercials
for an election campaign.150
By disentitling a foreign claimant as a fugitive, a court can effectively
transfer the claimant’s property to the government and deny the claimant the
right to be heard.151 To qualify for forfeiture, the disputed property must be
related to an alleged crime, but, without a hearing, a disentitled fugitive is
deprived of his opportunity to show that his property is unrelated to the
crime and not subject to forfeiture.152 Thus, on mere allegations, the government can confiscate a fugitive’s property through the use of “artful plead-

141. Sheth, supra note 86, at 25.
142. Id. The Asset Forfeiture Fund is the federal government’s largest forfeiture fund. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Sheth, supra note 86, at 25 (stating that state and local law enforcement share in
the proceeds of any federal civil forfeiture actions they refer to federal authorities, and state
law enforcement can use those proceeds in any manner they wish to support law enforcement
activities).
147. Id.
148. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 12.
149. Sheth, supra note 86, at 25.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Stolley, supra note 13, at 772.
152. Id.
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ing” by asserting that the claimant is a fugitive and that the property is related to the crime from which he is avoiding prosecution.153
3.

Dangers of Stripping Away Due Process Rights

Due to the inherent potential for abuse in civil forfeiture actions, courts
must be vigilant in protecting constitutional safeguards.154 The Fifth
Amendment right to due process requires that a defendant be given notice
and an adequate hearing on the merits before he can be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property.155 In Hovey v. Elliot, the Supreme Court stated that the
right to defend was an independent due process right:
To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an action, and to render decrees without any hearing whatever, is, in the very
nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an
instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute
of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power necessarily depends.156

This foundation of due process requires that an individual be permitted
to defend himself or his property in any court where his adversary can appear and prosecute.157 By disentitling a claimant in a civil forfeiture action,
the “government effectively strips away the rights to be heard and to defend
and transfers the property to the government based on the government’s
mere allegations of its connection to a crime.”158 The government thus hales
the claimant into court and then summarily denies an opportunity to defend
against the seizure of his property.159 Therefore, disentitlement becomes a
“thinly veiled excuse for punishment for an offense having no relation to the
merits of the government’s claims or the claimant’s defense.”160 Also, by
disentitling the claimant in a civil forfeiture action, the “government effectively strips away the rights to be heard and to defend and transfers the
property to the government based on the government’s mere allegations of

153. Id.
154. See Sheth, supra note 86, at 24 (stating that civil forfeiture has dangerously shifted
law enforcement’s priorities towards gaining property and profit, and this opportunity for
abuse has been increased by the lack of procedural safeguards available to protect innocent
property owners).
155. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 11.
156. 167 U.S. 409, 414 (1897) (stating that striking an answer and condemnation as punishment by default for contempt of court violated due process).
157. Stolley, supra note 13, at 770.
158. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 11–12.
159. Stolley, supra note 13, at 771.
160. Id.
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its connection to a crime.” 161 Thus, procedural safeguards to protect due
process remain necessary in civil forfeiture actions because of the direct
financial stake that the government has in the outcome of the forfeiture proceedings.162
IV. SOLUTIONS: PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS
In order to preserve the rights of extradition claimants and to shield
them from potential government abuse in civil forfeiture, extradition claimants need more robust protections. A narrower definition of “fugitive” in the
disentitlement doctrine would protect more of claimants’ rights in extradition proceedings.163 Also, if Congress were to exclude extradition claimants
from the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine by amending the
current statute, these claimants would be shielded from government abuse
by the ability to exercise their rights concerning both due process164 and extradition.165 Codifying the intent analysis of the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits166 concerning the disentitlement doctrine would be another
method that Congress could use to protect these claimants in civil forfeiture.
A.

Narrower Definition of Fugitive

By introducing a narrower definition of a “fugitive” into the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine, extradition claimants would be exempt from disentitlement and their various rights would be kept intact. Before CAFRA, a person who had never been present at a locality and then refused to enter was
161. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 17–18.
162. Sheth, supra note 86, at 26–27.
163. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012) (stating that the doctrine can be applied to one
who “declines to enter” the jurisdiction of the United States in order to avoid criminal prosecution); see generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 824–32 (E.D. Va. 2015) (interpreting a claimant’s contestation of extradition as “declining to enter” the jurisdiction, thus invoking disentitlement, depriving him of an opportunity to
contest forfeiture of his property).
164. See generally Smith, supra note 50, at 29 (stating that CAFRA provides a property
owner with an opportunity to present an innocent owner defense arguing that the owner did
not know of the illegal conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or that he took all reasonable
steps under the circumstances to terminate the illegal use of the property as soon as he gained
knowledge of the use).
165. See generally Kornfeld & De Corso, supra note 56, at 46 (stating that codification of
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine currently prevents a claimant from defending a civil forfeiture action from abroad).
166. See generally United States v. $6,976, 934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal
Bank of Scot. Int’l, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 554
F.3d 123, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that “mere notice or knowledge of an outstanding
warrant, coupled with a refusal to enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute”).
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not deemed a fugitive.167 The definition of fugitive was more in line with its
common law definition, which stated that a fugitive from justice was a person who, after committing a crime, fled the jurisdiction of the court where
the crime was committed or who concealed himself to avoid prosecution.168
The premise of this definition was that a defendant who deliberately disobeyed the legal system should be disentitled from using the court’s resources
to determine his claims.169
By returning to the common law definition of fugitive, the purpose of
the disentitlement doctrine would still be accomplished, and the rights of
foreign claimants in civil forfeiture actions would be respected. Foreign
claimants involved in extradition have a right to contest their extradition
under many treaties.170 By exercising this right, extradition claimants who
have never entered the United States are not flouting the justice system by
fleeing the jurisdiction; therefore, the rationale underlying disentitlement
does not justify disentitling them from contesting the civil forfeiture of their
property.
1.

Eliminate Phrase “To Enter” From 28 U.S.C. § 2466

A narrower definition of fugitive could also be achieved by eliminating
the phrase “to enter”171 from the codified disentitlement doctrine. By using
the phrases “enter” and “reenter,” Congress extended the disentitlement doctrine beyond common law fugitives—persons who were in the United States
when they committed their alleged crimes and refused to return—to individuals who have never been in the United States, but refuse to enter the country.172 By eliminating the phrase “to enter” from 28 U.S.C. § 2466, extradition claimants who had never entered the United States would not automatically be eligible for the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine by
the exercise of their rights to contest extradition.
Foreign claimants living abroad most likely were not residing in their
home country to avoid prosecution in the United States; this is especially
true of claimants who have never set foot in the United States.173 Declaring
these claimants, who are fighting extradition to stay in their home, to be
167. See Forfeiture and Penalties, supra note 21, at § 63.
168. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2004).
169. United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1991), abrogated by Degen v.
United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
170. See generally Garcia & Doyle, supra note 97, at 22 (explaining the requirements for
probable cause in order to extradite individual and the hearing required).
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(B) (2012).
172. Collazos, 368 F.3d. at 199–200.
173. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 828 (E.D. Va. 2015) (arguing that the claimant remained in his home country because he
has a home there, his family is there, and he intended to continue to work and live there).
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fugitives and thus barred from defending their property174 is an abuse of disentitlement and a distortion of the term fugitive.
2.

Protection of Extradition Claimant’s Rights

If the fugitive disentitlement doctrine were more narrowly tailored to
exclude defendants who had never entered the United States and were contesting extradition, the rights of extradition plaintiffs in civil forfeiture actions would be protected. The present codification of the doctrine175 restricts
a foreign claimant from exercising his legal right to contest extradition or,
conversely, his right to a due process hearing in the civil forfeiture action.176
By disentitling a claimant who “declines to enter”177 the jurisdiction of the
United States, the courts have effectively prevented any claimant from contesting forfeiture from abroad.178
By returning to a narrower definition of a fugitive as a person who
flees a place after committing a crime to avoid prosecution, a foreign claimant, who contests the sufficiency of probable cause for his extradition, will
not be subject to disentitlement simply because his contestation of extradition is interpreted as refusal to enter the United States. The foreign claimant
may still be deemed a fugitive if he refuses to return to the country after
committing a crime here, or if he flees and evades the jurisdiction.179 Claimants legally residing abroad, however, would be able to use their due process
right to defend the civil forfeiture, as well as maintain their legal right to
contest extradition, without being forced to choose between the two.
B.

Exclude Extradition Claimants from the Application of 28 U.S.C. §
2466

Another solution to preserve the rights of claimants legally resisting extradition would be prohibiting the application of the disentitlement doctrine.
The purpose of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is to prohibit individuals
174. See generally Eng, 951 F.2d at 467 (declaring a claimant to be a fugitive subject to
disentitlement in civil forfeiture because he did not submit to extradition and return to the
United States).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466.
176. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 827–32 (E.D. Va. 2015); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
48 (1993); Stolley, supra note 13, at 770.
177. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(B) (applying the doctrine to a claimant who
avoided prosecution in a related criminal matter by declining to enter the United States).
178. See generally Kornfeld & De Corso, supra note 56, at 46 (stating that CAFRA codified the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which prevents a claimant from defending civil
forfeiture from abroad).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(A)–(C).
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from using the resources of the courts to further their claims while avoiding
the courts’ jurisdiction in another matter.180 This purpose is not constitutionally construed when the application of the doctrine results in the loss of either the claimant’s extradition or due process rights. Prohibiting the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to claimants who are legal residents of a foreign country would prevent government abuse in civil forfeiture by retaining their right to be heard and to defend their property. Accordingly, claimants involved in extradition should be exempt from disentitlement in forfeiture proceedings in order to preserve their rights and be protected from potential forfeiture abuse.
1.

Rationales of 28 U.S.C. § 2466 Do Not Apply to Extradition
Claimants

Fugitive disentitlement has been applied in forfeiture proceedings in
order to prevent “the impropriety of permitting a fugitive to pursue a [civil]
claim in federal court where he might accrue a benefit, while at the same
time avoiding a [criminal] action of the same court that might sanction
him”181 An extradition claimant, however, is not “flouting” the system when
he chooses to exercise his legal right to show that the foreign state lacks
probable cause in an extradition hearing.182
Several other rationales have been proposed for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine since its introduction into common law, such as enforceability, disentitlement, the efficiency and dignity of the appellate process, and
deterrence.183 These rationales, however, are inapplicable in the extradition
context. The first rationale, enforceability of a court’s judgment, was based
on the concept that a criminal defendant who flees from justice during the
time of his appeal cannot be forced to submit to that court’s judgment.184
Thus, a fugitive defendant could not benefit from a successful appeal, or
conversely, evade an adverse adjudication.185 An absent claimant in a civil
forfeiture proceeding, however, “does not threaten the integrity of the forfeiture proceeding.”186 In a civil forfeiture action, the court must have jurisdic-

180. United States v. $6,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 581 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2009).
181. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
182. Beckford & Hamilton, supra note 96, at *1. Under New Zealand extradition law, the
prosecution must show that there is enough evidence to substantiate the charges against the
defendants, and the defendants are given an opportunity to rebut those charges by showing
that the indictment lacks probable cause. Id.
183. Griffith, supra note 23, at 209.
184. Stolley, supra note 13, at 776.
185. Id.
186. United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir.
1994).
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tion over the property, not the claimant.187 Thus, despite a claimant’s absence, a valid order of forfeiture would be fully enforceable.188 As a result, a
foreign claimant’s presence or absence at the proceeding would have no
effect on the enforceability of the forfeiture.
The second rationale, disentitlement of a fugitive, has also been rationalized on the theory that a fugitive’s flight to avoid prosecution is “‘tantamount to [a] waiver or abandonment’ of any appeal or claim”, and thus the
fugitive is disentitled to relief.189 In this context, the fugitive is deemed to
have disrespected the legal process and therefore has no right to call upon
the court to adjudicate his claim.190 This may be true where a fugitive appellant seeks a reversal of a conviction by using the court to his own benefit
while evading the court’s jurisdiction in the case of an unfavorable adjudication.191 In a civil forfeiture action, however, the claimant does not initiate the
proceedings or initiate the use of the resources of the court.192 Thus, the expansion of disentitlement into cases where a claimant is barred from defending his property would result in a violation of due process.193 A claimant in a
civil forfeiture action initiated by the government is not “‘call[ing] upon the
court;’ he’s merely defending himself and his property.”194 The claimant
also has not scorned the judicial authority of the courts or sought out the
court system for relief.195
The third rationale, the efficiency and dignity of the appellate process,
also does not apply to fugitive disentitlement concerning extradition claimants. The disentitlement doctrine was originally designed to “ensure orderly
and efficient judicial procedure.”196 This rationale was based on the idea that
the fugitive’s absence during the appellate process was a defiance of the
legal system and that the fugitive’s escape caused delay in court proceedings.197 A fugitive appellant’s absence during a criminal appeal “disrupt[ed]
the orderly flow” of a court’s judicial process.198 In order to prevent these
delays, courts have inherent power to address the issues presented by criminal fugitives who have flaunted the appellate process.199
187. Stolley, supra note 13, at 776 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S.
234, 240 (1993)).
188. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 18.
189. Stolley, supra note 13, at 777.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 19.
194. Id. at 25.
195. Id.
196. Stolley, supra note 13, at 778.
197. Id.
198. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at. 20.
199. Id.
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A claimant’s failure to appear in a civil forfeiture action, however, has
no effect on the court’s proceedings.200 An absent claimant can effectively
appear by counsel in the forfeiture proceeding and, through this counsel, the
claimant can satisfactorily adjudicate his challenge to the forfeiture.201 The
claimant’s absence thus has no effect on the proceedings of the court, and
the claimant’s absence in the separate criminal case does not in any way
affect the integrity of the forfeiture action.202 In sum, a claimant’s absence in
a forfeiture proceeding while he is contesting extradition has no effect on
the proceedings on the court and, as a result, the disentitlement of fundamental due process protection is an unnecessary remedy for a problem that
does not exist.
The last rationale proposed for disentitlement also does not hold true in
the context of civil forfeiture with foreign claimants. This rationale states
that by threatening disentitlement in criminal appeals, a defendant would be
less inclined to flee from justice.203 This threat would be a powerful incentive not to flee for a criminal fugitive who would lose his opportunity to be
vindicated in an appeal.204 This deterrence, however, does not hold true for a
foreign claimant in an extradition proceeding because “[g]ranting a hearing
on the validity of seizure to forfeiture claimants who are fugitives in a criminal proceeding does not encourage potential defendants to flee.”205 In the
context of foreign claimants, the “alleged ‘fugitives’ never ‘escaped’ from
anywhere—they merely continued to lawfully reside in their countries of
residence—there is no conduct to deter.”206 As the Supreme Court in Degan
v. United States stated, “the need to deter flight from criminal prosecution . .
. [is] substantial, but disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for advancing
them.”207
2.

Protection of Due Process and Extradition Related Rights

By excluding foreign claimants involved in extradition from the application of fugitive disinterment, their due process right to an opportunity to
defend their property and their right to contest extradition would be preserved. One court has stated that the exercise of rights in the claimants’
home country “may cause disadvantages for the claimants with respect to
litigation occurring in America [but that] does not mean that they are being
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Stolley, supra note 13, at 779.
Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 20.
Stolley, supra note 13, at 779.
Id. at 780.
Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 22.
Stolley, supra note 13, at 780–81.
Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 22.
517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996).
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treated unfairly or that they are denied their enjoyment of rights in [their
home country].”208 The choice that extradition claimants are forced to make
in a civil forfeiture proceeding between their due process rights and right to
contest extradition shows the falsity of this statement. The rationales of disentitlement in forfeiture do not apply to foreign claimants in any meaningful
way,209 and instead the application of the doctrine works a gross injustice by
denying them the opportunity to contest forfeiture of their property or by
denying them the opportunity to contest their extradition.
If extradition claimants were exempted from the disentitlement doctrine, they would be free to exercise both their right to a hearing in the civil
forfeiture action and their right to contest their extradition upon a showing
of lack of probable cause. A civil forfeiture action does not require that anyone be charged with a crime.210 Thus, the presence of the defendant in the
related criminal matter has no bearing on the validity of the forfeiture action.211 Disentitlement serves none of the purposes behind its enactment,
other than acting as a “‘random pattern of punishment’ and a ‘miscarriage of
justice.’”212
Courts have a valid interest in deterring crime, and civil forfeiture,
when properly applied, can serve the public good.213 Property that is not
illegally acquired or used, however, should not be subject to forfeiture even
if the owner of the property is a fugitive.214 Thus, a forfeiture action should
not be dismissed because “[t]he only way to make a just determination of
whether that property is forfeitable is to afford the claimant an opportunity
to be heard.”215 Constitutional and treaty-related rights would not be trampled by excusing foreign claimants involved in extradition proceedings from
disentitlement.216 Other foreign claimants not involved in extradition, however, who could not prove the innocent ownership of their property, would
still lose that property in civil forfeiture, thus upholding the integrity of the
forfeiture proceeding.217
208. United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 833 (E.D.
Va. 2015).
209. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993); All
Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 827–32; Stolley, supra note 13, at 770.
210. Kornfield & De Corso, supra note 56, at 40.
211. See generally Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 17–18 (stating that a forfeiture
order is fully enforceable despite a claimant’s absence).
212. Griffith, supra note 23, at 218.
213. Collins, supra note 5, at 645.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993); United
States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 827–32 (E.D. Va. (2015);
Stolley, supra note 13, at 770.
217. See Collins, supra note 5, at 645.
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Shield from Potential Government Abuse

If extradition claimants were exempted from the disentitlement doctrine, they would be better equipped to battle the prevalence of government
abuse by their ability to defend a civil forfeiture action.218 The government is
the initiator in a civil forfeiture action, and the property owner is in court,
not by his or her own actions, but rather in order to defend his property
against that action.219 Thus, the application of the doctrine in civil forfeiture
actions is “inherently unfair” where “the government already has a substantial advantage over the claimants.”220 The government need only show probable cause that the property is related to the alleged crime, and this advantage further outweighs the claimant’s hefty burden of proof when he is
disentitled to defend the government’s allegations. 221 As a result, the government avoids its slight burden and prevents a claimant from defending
against a “possibly unfair seizure.”222
Disentitlement eliminates court examination as to whether the government seized property in a forfeiture proceeding to which it has no legal
right.223 Therefore, the government is able to abuse disentitlement by avoiding “judicial scrutiny of the soundness of its allegations and the merits of its
case.”224 This potential for abuse is magnified when the exercise of extradition rights is interpreted as refusal to enter the United States, thus invoking
disentitlement and barring a foreign claimant from defending his property
against the government’s allegations.225 As a result, foreign claimants should
be exempt from the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2466 when they are legally
contesting extradition, and should be allowed to counter the potential for
government abuse in civil forfeiture.
C.

Universally Adopt the Intent Analysis of the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits

Extradition claimants in a civil forfeiture action would be afforded
more protection of their rights if the intent analysis from the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits were universally adopted in the application of the
218. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 5 (stating that “[a]t minimum, due process
requires a right to be heard,” which is even more essential in a government initiated forfeiture
action so defendants can defend against the government’s claims and tendency to abuse civil
forfeiture).
219. Collins, supra note 5, at 639.
220. Stolley, supra note 13, at 782.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
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disentitlement doctrine. This intent analysis focuses on more than just a
claimant’s knowledge of a warrant for his arrest paired with the claimant’s
refusal to enter the United States when determining if a claimant had the
requisite intent necessary for the invocation of disentitlement.226
Under any of the three ways provided by the statute to prove evasion,
the fugitive must have acted “in order to avoid criminal prosecution.”227
Thus, a foreign claimant must have acted with the intent to avoid prosecution when declining to enter the country.228 The government is then charged
with proving its burden that a claimant remained outside the United States in
order to avoid the criminal charges against him.229
As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in $6,976,934.65, Plus Interest, the government does not meet this burden simply by showing that the
claimant in the civil forfeiture action remained outside of United States jurisdiction.230 The court concluded that because the claimant voluntarily left
the United States before the criminal prosecution, and because there was
evidence that the claimant did not wish to reenter the United States regardless of any criminal charges, the government did not meet its burden of
proof regarding the necessary intent for disentitlement. 231 The Sixth Circuit
echoed this in United States v. Salti232 when it determined that the claimant’s
intent to avoid prosecution was not sufficiently proved due to factors that
showed that the claimant might have refused to return to the United States
for health reasons, and not necessarily to avoid criminal proceedings.233
If this analysis of the requisite intent under disentitlement were adopted, foreign claimants would be presented with an opportunity to show that
their contestation of extradition was due to other factors other than avoiding
criminal prosecution. Although avoiding criminal prosecution may be a significant motivation for a claimant’s refusal to enter the United States, there
are numerous other factors that may affect a foreign claimant’s decision to
contest his extradition.234 If these factors were found to be a sufficiently mo226. See United States v. $6,976, 934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of
Scot. Int’l, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 554 F.3d 123,
132 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that “mere notice or knowledge of an outstanding warrant,
coupled with a refusal to enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute”).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 132–33.
232. 579 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2009).
233. Id. at 664.
234. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d
813, 828 (E.D. Va. 2015) (arguing that the claimant resisted entry into the United States
because he had never been to the United States, he lived in New Zealand where his family
owned a house, and he desired to continue to live and work there, and enforce his rights);

2016]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

153

tivating force behind the claimant’s desire to not enter the United States,
disentitlement would not strip him of the ability to defend the forfeiture of
his property. Unlike the other circuit approaches to the intent analysis,
which focus on the resistance of extradition as an obvious exhibition of intent to avoid prosecution,235 the government would have to clearly show the
claimant’s intent by more than the fact that the claimant exercised his legal
right to contest the probable cause sufficient for his extradition.
The adoption of the intent analysis of the D.C. and Sixth Circuits
would provide foreign claimants, who are resisting extradition for reasons
other than the sole desire to avoid criminal proceedings, more protections in
civil forfeiture actions through the exercise of their rights. However, the
disentitlement doctrine would still be applicable to those extradition claimants who declined to enter or re-enter the country solely in order to avoid
prosecution.236 This analysis of intent would strike a balance between the
interests of a foreign claimant resisting extradition for valid reasons other
than prosecution avoidance and the Congressional and judicial interests in
disallowing foreign fugitives to call upon the resources of the court while
simultaneously evading its jurisdiction with the intent to avoid criminal
prosecution.237 Accordingly, this approach would provide foreign claimants
more protections than the methods provided by other circuits. As a result,
this intent analysis should be universally adopted to ensure that foreign
claimants in civil forfeiture are given a better opportunity to exercise all of
their rights, both in due process and extradition, before disentitlement is
invoked in any civil forfeiture action.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in a civil forfeiture action involving extradition claimants creates complications and unforeseen consequences. The codification of the doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2466
has only exacerbated these problems. Claimants are denied an opportunity to
defend their property, and thus are stripped of their due process rights and
are more exposed to potential government abuse in forfeiture. Forfeiture
claimants have a right to defend their property before it can be permanently
seized. This right should not be affected through their exercise of additional
rights during the extradition process.

United States v. Technodyne, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 368, 376 (2d Cir. 2014) (arguing that claimants remained abroad because of publicity, and seizure of their property left them without
means of financial support in the United States).
235. See generally supra notes 92–94, and accompanying text.
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C) (2012).
237. See Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
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In order to safeguard the protections these rights encompass, the codified fugitive disentitlement needs to be revised. This revision could take the
form of the Supreme Court resolving the split in the circuits by holding that
the intent element under the statute is best met by analyzing whether avoidance of criminal prosecution was the sole reason the alleged fugitive declined to enter or re-enter the United States. The rights of claimants in extradition and civil forfeiture would also be protected if Congress redrafted
the disentitlement provision to exclude persons living abroad who had never
entered the United States. These provisions would enable foreign petitioners
to preserve their right to contest extradition, as well as ensure their right to a
due process hearing to defend the civil forfeiture action.
Foreign supplicants in civil forfeiture actions would no longer have to
choose between their right to defend their property or their right to contest
extradition. Extradition claimants are innocent until proved guilty in a related criminal matter, and their property should not be forfeited absent an opportunity to prove the disconnect between the property seized and the alleged criminal activity. By narrowing the scope of the disentitlement doctrine as applied to extradition claimants or by eliminating them from the
scope of the doctrine altogether, foreign claimants would be protected from
potential government abuse in civil forfeiture, and their rights to due process
and concerning extradition would be kept intact.
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